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 II 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the returns to the aggregate portfolio of insider trades in Norway 
and the connection between insider trading and the asset management industry during 
the period January 2008 until July 2012. I find strong evidence that the aggregate 
insider does not earn abnormal returns, but instead realises inferior returns relative to 
non-insiders. This result is attributed to a number of different factors including that 
insiders often trade purely for liquidity or diversification purposes; there is evidence 
that insiders follow contrarian investment strategies; and insiders are subject to a 
number of behavioural biases. Extending the study of insider trades to the asset 
management industry I find that Norwegian mutual funds affiliated with a financial 
conglomerate significantly outperform non-affiliated funds, and substantial evidence 
that insider trades, and hence information flows, can account for this difference in 
performance. These findings are in general robust to both the estimation method and 
the model used for the analysis, and have important implications for insider trading 
and the asset management industry. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The main tool that an investor can employ in their attempt to realise abnormal returns 
in financial markets is information, that and for an appropriate fee the assistance of 
professional fund managers. However, if the flow of information to the investor is 
compromised, and the professionals do not manage said investors’ assets on an equal 
playing field, is it ever possible for the private investor to consistently earn fair 
returns relative to more informed investors? And do some investment funds have an 
inherent advantage over others?  
 
What is being referred to above is the use of inside information. It is generally 
considered that if some sections of investors are able to exploit private information in 
order to obtain superior returns, then this puts other investors at a disadvantage. Thus, 
in the majority of developed financial markets around the world there is some form of 
legislation in place to protect investors against the use of inside information. The 
reference to professionals not playing on an equal field concerns the asset 
management industry, and specifically whether or not the use of inside information is 
prevalent in this specific area. 
 
This papers aims to straddle between the two main areas mentioned above: insider 
trading and the performance of professionally managed mutual funds in Norway. 
With respect to insider trading the intention is to evaluate whether insiders 
performance is superior to that of the uninformed investor, and with respect to the 
performance of mutual funds the goal is to assess whether funds that are associated 
with a financial conglomerate (affiliated funds) outperform independent funds (non-
affiliated funds).  
 
The study of insider trades follows, to some extent, the methodology laid out in 
Eckbo and Smith (1998). They assess the performance of an aggregate portfolio of 
insider trades in the Norwegian market using conditional asset pricing models. To that 
end the first requirement for this study is to create a portfolio of insider holdings for 
all publicly listed companies on the Oslo Exchange All Share Index for the period 
January 2008 to July 2012. This portfolio of insider holdings is then used to create 
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two separate insider returns portfolios, one reflecting insider ownership levels and the 
other reflecting insider value levels.  
 
To assess the performance of these insider portfolios the unconditional CAPM and 
Carhart (1997) models are used, in addition to the conditional versions of these 
models. Using these models I find that the insider portfolios reported alphas of 
between -0.025 and -0.04, which are economically and statistically significant values. 
The only exception to this is the conditional Carhart model, which reports alphas that 
are not significantly different from zero.  
 
The above results provide strong evidence that insiders do not in fact outperform 
uninformed investors, with their performance at best equal to them. This is consistent 
with Eckbo and Smith (1998), but in contrast to the results of Bris (2005) and Durnev 
and Nain (2007) who find evidence of positive insider returns in Norway.  The 
finding that insiders do not outperform uninformed investors is reassuring on some 
levels, but also begs the question as to why they do not realise abnormal gains. I 
conclude that this lack of insider profit is derived from a combination of factors: 
insiders often trade purely for liquidity or diversification purposes; there is evidence 
that insiders follow contrarian investment strategies; and insiders are subject to a 
number of behavioural biases.  
 
In their paper Eckbo and Smith (1998) argue that because the average mutual fund 
outperforms the insider portfolios, this is further evidence that there are no abnormal 
returns to insider trading. I propose an alternative view that inside information can 
flow through to mutual funds, and thus be utilised to improve their performance.  
 
However, first to allow parity with the Eckbo and Smith study I carry out a similar 
comparison of the performance of mutual funds and the insider portfolios. To assess 
the difference in performance it is first necessary to create an equal weighted portfolio 
of mutual fund returns, and then to create a difference portfolio by going long the 
equal weighted portfolio of mutual fund returns and short the insider portfolio returns. 
The performance of this difference portfolio is tested using the same models as the 
insider portfolio. I observe that the average mutual fund significantly outperforms the 
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insider portfolios with alphas ranging from 0.021 to 0.037, though again there is zero 
difference reported for the conditional Carhart models.  
 
The final stage of the analysis consisted of testing the hypothesis that inside 
information is used to allow affiliated mutual funds to attain superior returns, 
compared to their non-affiliated counterparts. Once again it is required that a 
difference portfolio is created, this time going long the affiliated funds and going 
short the non-affiliated funds, and defining affiliation as in Massa and Rehman 
(2008). This portfolio is analysed in the same manner as the difference between the 
average mutual fund and the insider portfolios. From the analysis I find strong 
evidence that affiliated funds outperformed non-affiliated funds with significant 
alphas of around 0.002 for all models. 
 
Having shown that affiliated funds perform better than non-affiliated funds, it is then 
necessary to test whether this difference is caused by inside information. In order to 
test this the two insider portfolios are added separately as independent variables in 
each of the models. From this I find that all of the alphas reduce, with many now only 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level, and all others zero. Furthermore the 
insider portfolio coefficients are highly significant in the models, indicating strong 
evidence that inside information is responsible for the difference in performance. 
Given the close ties between mutual funds and the financial conglomerates that own 
them, it is not necessarily surprising that information passes from one to the other. 
However, this is certainly an issue for those deciding to invest in mutual funds, as 
clearly this may represent a form of insider trading that is not being monitored at 
present.  
 
The analysis in this paper adds to current literature on the topic with several important 
and unique findings: namely the negative performance of the insider portfolios, that 
funds affiliated with financial conglomerates outperform their non-affiliated 
counterparts, and that this superior performance of affiliated funds is explained by 
inside information. These results are in general robust to the type of model, and 
methodology used to estimate the model. 
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Thus, to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section: it is possible for 
private investors to earn fair returns since there is evidence that the aggregate insider 
portfolio underperforms when all publicly available information is accounted for; and 
investment funds affiliated with a financial conglomerate seem to have an inherent 
advantage relative to independent funds, due to the pervasiveness of inside 
information in affiliated funds.  
 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature 
review on insider trading and flows of information in mutual funds, Section 3 presents 
the hypotheses, Section 4 outlines the methodology used in the analysis, Section 5 
summarizes the data used, Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 discusses the 
implications and concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Insider Trading 
 
Insider trading has long been a topic of tremendous contention in both academic 
circles and in financial markets. Much of the academic discussion on the subject 
focuses on whether or not insider trading should be regulated, or whether insiders 
should be able to use the additional information for investment decisions. Outwith this 
area, discussion is usually focussed on the substantial fines and prison sentences that 
are handed out to individuals found guilty of insider trading. Citing the case of Raj 
Rajaratnam1who was sentenced to 11 years in prison and fined over $150 million in 
2011, it is evident that insider trading is still a key area of interest for both finance 
academics and professionals.  
 
This section of the literature review will endeavour to cover the academic scope of 
insider trading, with reference to past studies on the topic, legal definitions, and with a 
focus on Norway.  A good starting point is to consider the definition of unlawful 
insider trading; Bainbridge (2000) states that insider trading is the trading of securities 
while in possession of material non-public information.  
 
While the definition of insider trading is broadly consistent across many developed 
market economies, whether or not insider trading is good for financial markets is 
often debated. At an intuitive level, inside information it seems is equivalent to an 
advantage to those working within corporations, and therefore it is possible that, if 
unregulated, it could have the effect of discouraging investment from non-insiders 
(Hanson, 2008). The reasoning behind this is that investors without inside information 
may believe that they will never realise superior returns when competing against 
other, informed, investors with vastly superior information. Leland (1992) finds that 
whether or not insider trading is detrimental to a market is dependent upon the 
economic environment, however, it is noted that factors are identified that favour the 
prohibition of insider trading.  
                                                
1 Raj Rajaratnam was found guilty of organising a complex web of connections within his hedge fund, 
Galleon Group, in order to acquire and profit from inside information (Hilzenrath, 2011). 
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Traditional insider trading studies often utilise an event study methodology, such as in 
the early study by Jaffe (1974), who finds that insiders earn significant abnormal 
returns. These event studies empirically measure how a stock price reacts to a specific 
event; in the case of Jaffe (1974) the impact of insider trades on stock prices in the 
months after the insider trade is the measure of interest. Many subsequent studies 
followed this methodology and found similar results in both the UK, King et al 
(1988), and Germany, Betzer and Theissen (2009), to name but two other countries 
where the same evidence of insider trading was prominent. These findings pose 
significant doubts as to the effectiveness of insider trading regulation given the 
existence of abnormal profits to insiders. From this, we can surmise that either many 
of the studies that have tackled insider trading have employed an incorrect approach, 
or that regulation is ineffective in preventing insiders from realising abnormal returns.  
 
Firstly, the effectiveness of regulation shall be considered in relation to insider trading 
abnormal returns. Bris (2005) considers insider trading laws on a global scale, and 
arrives at several important results: the introduction of insider trading regulation 
increases both the profitability, and the occurrence of insider trading, and that more 
severe penalties reduce the incidence of illegal insider trading. Of paramount 
importance to this paper, Bris notes that it is worse to have regulation that fails to 
prosecute those who violate, than no law at all, and cites Norway as an example of 
this situation. Another global study into insider trading regulation by Durnev and 
Nain (2007) finds that on average insider trading regulation is effective in reducing 
the incidence of illegal insider trading and private information trading. Once again 
this study aligns Norway with countries characterised by lax regulation on insider 
trading such as the Philippines and Italy. From these studies we can infer that 
regulation is effective when enforced correctly, but can cause more harm than good 
when enforcement of regulation is poor, since insiders are not punished for their 
actions, but are able to gain higher returns due to the presence of regulation. 
 
It seems that insider trading is strongly affected by the level of regulation within a 
market. A reasonable question deriving from this finding is what is the correct level of 
regulation? Acharya and Johnson (2010) provide a theoretical model that finds that 
the as the number of insiders in a market increases, so regulation must become stricter 
in order for the market to remain in equilibrium.  Therefore in smaller markets, such 
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as Norway, it may be optimal to have lower levels of regulation than more developed 
markets such as the US and the UK. This finding could explain why Norway was 
noted as lacking in regulation previously.  
 
As stated already it is most common for academic studies to apply event study 
methodology when examining insider trading. However, Eckbo and Smith (1998) 
argue that this method is incorrect: although event studies are good at testing whether 
insiders trade prior to large changes in stock prices, they do not consider the actual 
holding periods of investors, and therefore cannot estimate the expected gains from 
insider trading. Instead Eckbo and Smith use a portfolio of insider returns and find no 
evidence of insider abnormal returns. However, as Inci et al (2010) state, no other 
studies have confirmed this finding of Eckbo and Smith. This could be down to the 
unique methods used in the study by Eckbo and Smith, or the characteristics of the 
Norwegian market, nevertheless it steers research into a study of the Norwegian 
market and insider trading.   
 
Insider trading is undoubtedly still an issue in financial markets and there are 
arguments for several different methods in which to test for its prevalence, and 
whether or not insider regulation is necessary or not. Nonetheless there does seem to 
be some general consensus that illegal insider trading does occur in practice, what is 
less clear is how this affects both investors and financial markets.  
 
2.2 Information Flows and Mutual Funds 
 
The concept of information flows in financial markets is imperative to the 
understanding of why insider trading is important, and is one of the longest standing 
notions in academic finance. Information flows are the main component of the 
efficient markets hypothesis as developed by Fama (1970). Fama defines an efficient 
market as one in which prices fully reflect available information, and in addition to 
this he proposes three separate versions of the hypothesis: weak form, semi-strong 
form, and strong form. What is key, in relation to insider trading, is the difference 
between the semi-strong form and the strong form of the hypothesis: the strong form 
of the hypothesis states that prices should reflect all information, both public and 
private, whereas only public information is present in the semi-strong form. 
 8 
Accordingly, in markets that enforce insider trading regulation it should be expected 
that they are at best semi-strong form efficient. But if markets are found to be strong 
form efficient this could indicate that private information is determining prices.  
 
There have been many studies carried out assessing market efficiency in financial 
markets. Finnerty (1976) was one of the earliest studies relating insiders and market 
efficiency, and concludes that due to the ability of insiders to earn abnormal returns 
the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis must be rejected. This insight is 
consistent with the previous statement that in the presence of insider regulation it 
should not be feasible to have a strong form efficient market. There have also been 
several further studies confirming this rejection of strong form efficient markets, such 
as the Chan et al (1997) study of market efficiency in 18 different countries, which 
finds that equity markets are characterised by weak-form efficiency. It seems that the 
empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that inside information is not 
integrated into market prices. Consequently, the use of inside information to trade 
constitutes an advantage to those that can gain from it, and a disadvantage to all other 
actors in the market.  
 
This concept of the advantage of additional, non-public, information becomes very 
important when mutual funds are taken into consideration. Of the multitude of studies 
into mutual funds it is often found that after expenses are taken into account, on 
average mutual funds do not outperform the benchmark index (Aragon and Ferson, 
2006). This presents a puzzle in the academic environment, why do investors continue 
to flock to active mutual funds when they would be better off holding either the 
benchmark index or a passive fund. One explanation is offered by Berk and Green 
(2004) who develop a new model, and find that differential ability across fund 
managed does exist, and is rewarded. Another explanation offered for this anomaly is 
that investments by mutual funds improve the informativeness of stock prices (Jiang 
et al, 2012). The logic behind this is that stocks that are heavily weighted by active 
mutual funds outperform their underweighted counterparts, and that once this view 
becomes publicly available the performance increase dissipates. Therefore, Jiang et al 
argue that the failure to split up mutual fund performance into active and passive 
portfolios is the reason that studies fail to recognise the value that fund managers add.  
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The main point that can be taken from the Jiang et al study cited above is that mutual 
funds have access to some information set that is not available to the market as a 
whole. Since this information is not available to the whole market it can be deduced 
that this information is private, if we assume that financial markets are characterised 
by the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis. This leads to the 
pertinent question of whether or not mutual funds are utilising inside information to 
improve their performance.  
 
An interesting study that relates directly to the question stated above is carried out by 
Massa and Rehman (2008), and deals with the information flows between mutual 
funds and banks. Massa and Rehman find that mutual funds affiliated with financial 
conglomerates, such as banks, realise significantly higher returns after investing in 
stocks that have received loans from the financial conglomerate. This finding 
demonstrates how privileged, inside, information can flow through different channels 
in order to result in a performance advantage to certain affiliated funds. Adding 
weight to the concept that information flows in mutual funds can lead to performance 
advantages Lee (2014) studies the relationship between affiliated funds of funds and 
regular funds, finding that investor behaviour is driven by information flows. 
Massoud et al (2011) extend this analysis into the hedge fund industry, finding that 
some hedge funds offer loans to firms, and subsequently take up positions in these 
firms based on private information.  
 
Information flows are of critical importance to financial markets; they are the key to 
the pricing of securities and the drivers of activity in markets. From the literature 
noted above, it seems that there is a strong possibility that insider information is 
utilised by mutual funds in a manner that gives them superior performance through 
privileged information. Clearly, further examination is required to see if these results 
are consistent across markets and time horizons.  
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3 Hypotheses 
 
This section outlines the hypotheses that I concentrate on in this paper, and also some 
motivation as to why the study of insider trading is both necessary and interesting. 
 
3.1 Motivating The Study of Insider Trading 
 
Investors trade based upon the information set that they have available at any point in 
time. In an unconditional world all investor decisions are based on the risk return 
trade off as determined by some of the models that will be described in the 
methodology section. In contrast in a conditional world investors have access to all 
publicly available information when making any investment decisions. Therefore it is 
natural to assume that investors in a conditional world have an advantage relative to 
investors with just an unconditional information set. Further to this if any investors 
have access to further private information, informed investors, then this could 
constitute an advantage relative to the unconditional and conditional, uninformed, 
investors. Hence, it would be expected that in the absence of market restrictions and 
legislation that informed investors would outperform uninformed investors due to the 
larger information set that they are able to utilise. Yet, in nearly every financial 
market around the world there are restrictions in place that prohibit the use of private 
information as a basis for trading.  
 
The expectation of superior insider performance, as stated above, can be summarised 
in mathematical terms. For simplicity only the conditional case will be used to 
represent uninformed investors. First let 𝑟!,!!! denote the excess return2 on asset 𝑖 at 
period 𝑡 + 1 . Then it is necessary to consider the conditional expected return 𝐸(𝑟!,!!! 𝑍!), where 𝑍! is the set of all publicly available information at time 𝑡. As 
stated already investors in a conditional world have access to all publicly available 
information and thus trade utilising this entire information set, 𝑍!. Hence the expected 
return of uninformed investors is simply the conditional expected return already 
stated.  
 
                                                
2 Excess Returns are simply the return of an asset minus the risk free rate. 
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Informed investors have access to private information and consequently have a larger 
information set than 𝑍! on which to base trades. The information set available to 
informed investors is denoted 𝐼!. Since informed investors have a larger information 
set then they should be able to take advantage of any instance when: 
 
 𝑟!,!!! − 𝐸(𝑟!,!!! 𝑍!) > 0  (1)  
 
That is when the realised returns are greater than the conditional expected returns, 
abnormal returns are created that informed investors can obtain.  
 
Thus from Eckbo and Smith (1998) informed investors have the ability to “buy low 
and sell high” and therefore the returns to these informed investors are at least as great 
as those to uninformed investors: 
 
 𝐸 𝑟!,!!! 𝑍! , 𝐼! −   𝐸(𝑟!,!!! 𝑍!) ≥ 0   (2)  
 
The analysis that follows in this paper will at its centre consider this very relation 
above.  
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
 
I propose two separate hypotheses that this paper will deal with in due course. The 
first derives from equation 2 above, and updates the study by Eckbo and Smith (1998) 
in assessing the performance of insiders in the Norwegian market. This hypothesis is 
that due to the fact that insiders have a larger information set than non-insiders they 
should outperform them on an aggregate level.  
 
The second hypothesis that I propose attempts to connect insider trading and the asset 
management industry. Eckbo and Smith (1998) argue that because Norwegian mutual 
funds outperform insiders that this is evidence against the prevalence of insider 
trading. In contrast to this I propose that mutual funds are themselves privy to insider 
information, and combine this with their superior investment knowledge to achieve 
abnormal returns. Concentrating on a subset of the mutual fund industry I hypothesise 
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that mutual funds affiliated with financial conglomerates will outperform non-
affiliated funds, and that this is due to the leakage of inside information from the 
financial conglomerates to these funds.  
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4 Methodology 
 
In section of the paper I describe the empirical analysis that is used to investigate 
insider trading and mutual fund performance in Norway.  
 
4.1 Price Series  
 
The majority of data gathered for this study is retrieved in monthly and price series 
format. Therefore it is necessary to convert this into a more appropriate form for the 
analysis that is performed. In order to analyse the data in any meaningful way it is 
necessary to convert the monthly price series into monthly returns. They are 
converted in the following manner: 
 
 𝑅!" = 𝑙𝑛 𝑃!"𝑃!"!!  (3)  
 
where 𝑅!" is the return on asset 𝑖’s in month 𝑡, 𝑃!" is the price of asset 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 
and 𝑃!"!! is the price of asset 𝑖 in month 𝑡 − 1 , 𝑖 = the relevant asset, 𝑡 is the relevant 
month, and Ln is the natural logarithm. Log returns are chosen over arithmetic returns 
as over long time periods it has been shown that log returns approximate the normal 
distribution (Fergusson and Platen, 2006). That log returns are likely to follow a 
normal distribution helps satisfy some of the assumptions that are necessary in order 
to carry out regression analysis later. 
 
4.2 Portfolio Definitions 
 
Throughout this paper the majority of analysis concerns the performance of a variety 
of different portfolios. In this section of the methodology each of these portfolios is 
defined clearly, and it should be noted that these portfolios are used as the dependent 
variables in the models defined in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
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4.2.1 Insider Portfolio 
 
The insider portfolio plays an important role throughout the study, and is therefore 
specified using two separate methods. The first step is to define how weights are 
allocated to firms, and following Eckbo and Smith (1998) the value weights, 𝑤!"! , and 
the ownership weights, 𝑤!"! , are defined in the following manner: 
 
 𝑤!"! = ℎ!" ℎ!"!!!!!   (4)  
 
 𝑤!"! = 𝑠!" 𝑆!" 𝑠!" 𝑆!"!!!!!  (5)  
 
where 𝑁! is the total number of insider shares in the portfolio, ℎ!" is the total market 
value of all insiders’ holdings in firm 𝑖 at the end of month 𝑡, 𝑆!" is the total number 
of shares outstanding in firm 𝑖 at the end of month 𝑡, 𝑠!" is the number of shares held 
by insiders in firm 𝑖 at the end of month 𝑡. These weights are constructed in such as 
manner so as to sum to one, and to assign any firm without insiders a value of zero.  
 
These vectors of weights derived from equations 4 and 5 are assigned to the excess 
returns of each firm, for each month, to construct the excess return on the insider 
portfolio as: 
 
 𝑟!,!!! = 𝑤!"𝑟!,!!!!!!!!    (6)  
 
where 𝑟!,!!! is insider portfolio 𝑝’s return over month 𝑡 + 1 in excess of the risk free 
rate, and 𝑤!" is either the value or ownership weights; each will be used to create a 
separate time series of returns. Therefore equation 6 yields two different series of 
aggregate insider returns. These series of returns act as the dependent variable in all of 
the models considered.  
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4.2.2 Mutual Funds vs. Insider Portfolios 
 
As a bridge between the two hypotheses of this paper a comparison of the 
performance of the insider portfolios against the set of mutual funds is carried out. An 
equal weighted portfolio of all mutual funds is compared to each of the two insider 
portfolios, and tested using the models outlined later in this section. In the results only 
the alphas will be reported since this is the only concern for this part of the study. 
 
The return for the average mutual fund is given by: 
 
 𝑟!"",! = !!"",!!!"!!!!! !!     (7)  
 
where 𝑟!"",! is the equal weighted portfolio of all fund returns at time 𝑡, 𝑊!"",! =1 𝐺! is the weight allocated to any fund at time 𝑡, 𝑟!" is the return of fund 𝛿 at time 𝑡, 
and 𝐺! is the number of funds at time 𝑡. 
 
The next step is to create a difference portfolio, and since it is assumed that the 
mutual funds outperform the insider portfolios, as in previous studies, then this is 
done in the following manner: 
 
 𝑟!"##,! = 𝑟!"",! − 𝑟!,!   (8)  
 
where 𝑟!"##,! is the return on the difference portfolio at time 𝑡, and 𝑟!,! is the return 
for either the value or ownership insider portfolio as defined previously. Therefore 
from equation 8 a long position is taken up in the average mutual fund portfolio and a 
short position in the insider portfolios. Consequently there are two versions of the 
difference portfolio, one that uses the value insider portfolio, and one that uses the 
ownership insider portfolio.  
 
4.2.3 Fund Affiliation 
 
The final portfolio that I define considers the interaction between insider trading and 
mutual fund performance. This paper draws on the study by Massa and Rehman 
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(2008) that finds evidence that information flows from financial conglomerates to 
mutual funds. Therefore, as noted earlier, I hypothesise that mutual funds that are 
affiliated with financial conglomerates will outperform non-affiliated funds due to a 
leakage of information from the financial conglomerate to the mutual fund. Following 
the methodology of Massa and Rehman an affiliated fund is defined as a mutual fund 
that is directly owned by a financial conglomerate that is a lending bank. In this case a 
lending bank refers to the fact that the financial conglomerate lends to businesses, and 
not just individuals.  
 
Following the definition of an affiliated fund from above, I checked the ownership of 
each fund in the sample and allocate those that are owned by financial conglomerates 
that are lending banks to the affiliated fund group, and those that are not owned by 
these financial conglomerates to the non-affiliated fund group. Once funds have been 
defined as either affiliated or non-affiliated, portfolios of these two groups of funds 
are created. In this case equal weighted portfolios3 are used, these are created in the 
following manner: 
 
 𝑟!,! = !!,!!!"!!!!!!!   (9)  
 
 𝑟!",! = !!",!!!"!!!!! !!      (10)  
 
where 𝑟!,! is the equal weighted portfolio of affiliated fund returns at time 𝑡, 𝑟!",! is 
the equal weighted portfolio of non-affiliated fund returns at time 𝑡, 𝑊!,! = 1 𝑁! is 
the weight allocated to affiliated funds at time 𝑡 , 𝑊!",! = 1 𝑀!  is the weight 
allocated to non-affiliated funds at time 𝑡, 𝑟!" is the return of fund 𝛾 at time 𝑡, 𝑟!" is 
the return of fund 𝜆 at time 𝑡, 𝛾 is the set of affiliated funds, 𝜆 is the set of non-
affiliated funds, 𝑁! is the number of affiliated funds at time 𝑡, and 𝑀! is the number of 
non-affiliated funds at time 𝑡. For these equal weighted portfolios the number of funds 
in the affiliated or non-affiliated is allowed to vary over time; this means that the set 
                                                
3 It should be noted that from Fama (1998) the use of equal-weighted portfolios could produce different 
results from the use of value-weighted portfolios. 
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of funds is not restricted by selection bias due to the introduction of new funds, or the 
closing down of older funds.   
 
Since the hypothesis is that affiliated funds will outperform non-affiliated funds a 
convenient approach to assess this is to go long one portfolio and short the other. In 
this case this is done in the following manner: 
 
 𝑟!,! = 𝑟!,! − 𝑟!",!   (11)  
 
where 𝑟!,!  is the return on what will be known as the fund portfolio at time 𝑡. 
Therefore from equation 11 a long position is taken up in the affiliated portfolio and a 
short position in the non-affiliated portfolio.  
 
The keen investor might cite the finding of positive abnormal performance for the 
fund portfolio as a viable investment strategy. However this is not plausible in reality 
due to short-selling constraints in most markets, and even more so than that, the 
enormous fees associated with buying into so many mutual funds. Thus such a result 
could not be used to create investment strategies, only to observe the difference in 
how the groups of mutual funds perform.  
 
A final extension to the analysis of the fund portfolio is to include the insider 
portfolios, defined earlier in equation 6, as additional independent variables. Thus 
either the ownership or value weighted insider portfolios are added into the models 
one at a time. If these variables are significant then this indicates that the difference in 
returns between affiliated and non-affiliated funds is driven, in some manner, by 
insider trades.  
 
It is not simply a case of just throwing the insider portfolios into the regression model 
and assuming this is relevant to explaining the returns of the fund portfolio. First the 
argument must be made from an asset pricing perspective as to why the insider 
portfolios are a relevant risk factor. 
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From an intuitive perspective the inclusion of an insider trading portfolio to explain 
variations in asset prices makes sense: if it is assumed that insiders trade based upon 
private information then this should have the effect of moving an asset price closer to 
its intrinsic value. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) use a similar proxy for insider trades as 
an independent variable in order to test the predicative ability of insiders. Due to the 
likelihood that the insider portfolio affects asset prices, and the fact that similar 
methods have been used previously, it seems reasonable to use the insider portfolio as 
a risk factor in the analysis. 
 
4.3 Unconditional Analysis 
 
A number of different models are employed in this paper, the simplest of which are 
the unconditional models. Unconditional models have some of the most constraining 
assumptions, such as constant betas, but are nonetheless useful, and widely used, in 
many academic studies. Therefore the study follows the norm and begins with the 
most popular performance measure to date, the CAPM.  
 
4.3.1 CAPM 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), put forward by Sharpe, Lintner and 
Treynor4, enables financial performance to be measured relative to some absolute 
standard. The CAPM is specified in the following manner: 
 
 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑟!" − 𝑟!" + 𝜀!"   (12)  
 
where 𝑅!" is the excess return of asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝛽! is the regression estimate of the 
risk premium for asset 𝑖, 𝑟!" is the returns on the market (the Oslo Exhange All Share 
Index), 𝑟!" is the risk free rate as described in the data section, 𝜀!" is the error term for 
asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝛼! is the alpha for asset 𝑖, the excess return of the fund not 
attributable to the risk premium; with 𝑖 the relevant asset.  
 
                                                
4 Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Treynor (1961, 1962). 
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The 𝛼! coefficient from equation 7 is the most important factor here. When this value 
is positive it indicates that the asset has outperformed the relevant index over the 
period concerned, and a negative alpha indicates underperformance relative to the 
market index. Another variable of interest in this equation that could prove notable is 
the 𝛽! term. This measures how risky the asset is relative to the market index: the 
higher the beta the higher the level of risk. Therefore any differences in betas between 
the different insider portfolios could represent different insider trading strategies. 
 
4.3.2 Fama and French (1993) Three Factor Model 
 
The CAPM model, though seminal in finance theory, was found to have several 
distinguishing characteristics that suggest it may have been misspecified. Fama and 
French (1993) tackle this misspecification by creating a three factor model that 
extends the CAPM by including a size factor, SMB, and a book-to-market value 
factor, HML5. The Fama and French model is defined as:                               
 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!! 𝑟!" − 𝑟!" + 𝛽!!𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽!!𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀!"   (13)    
with 𝑅!", 𝛼!, 𝑟!", 𝑟!", and 𝜀!" the same as in the CAPM model and 𝛽!!, 𝛽!!,  𝛽!!, the 
estimated coefficients for the risk premium, SMB, and HML respectively. The 
interpretation of the 𝛼! is the same as in the CAPM case, and the interpretation of the 
betas is similar as well.  
 
4.3.3 Carhart (1997) Model 
 
Although the Fama and French three factor model improved upon the accuracy of the 
CAPM model it did not take into account the momentum effect found by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993). Carhart (1997) proposes extending the Fama and French (1993) 
three factor model by adding in an additional momentum, 𝑀𝑂𝑀, factor to account for 
the momentum effect. The new four factor model has the following form: 
 
                                                
5 For details on how these factors are create see Ødegaard (2011) 
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 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!! 𝑟!" − 𝑟!" + 𝛽!!𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽!!𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽!!𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝜀!" (14)  
 
where all the factors are as in the Fama and French three factor model with the 
additional terms 𝛽!!  and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 , representing the estimated coefficient for the 
momentum factor and the momentum factor respectively. Now when Carhart’s four 
factor model is used to assess security performance any abnormal returns due to the 
size effect, book-to-market value effect and the momentum effect have been taken 
into account. Note that in the actual analysis instead of using both the Fama and 
French three factor model and Carhart’s extension, only the Carhart model will be 
estimated.  
 
4.4 Conditional Analysis 
 
All of the models considered in the above section on unconditional analysis are 
subject to a number of biases due to the assumptions underlying the model. Of these 
the most important is that the unconditional models assume that the relationship 
between risk and excess returns is constant over time, constant betas. Evidently this is 
unlikely to be the case and was recognised as early as Jensen (1972). However, 
Jensen took the view that any variation from this is due to market timing ability or 
superior information in the context of fund performance. Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
argue to the contrary and state that abnormal performance as a result of publicly 
available information should not account for superior ability on the part of a fund 
manager. 
 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) give an intuitive reasoning as to why betas should vary 
over time. The relative risk of any one firm’s cash flow is likely to fluctuate with the 
state of the economy; a prime example of this would be firms increasing their 
leverage during periods of recession, and thus causing their market betas to rise 
correspondingly. Therefore, the beta of any firm is likely to depend on the publicly 
available information at that point in time, and consequently will vary throughout the 
business cycle. In order to account for this Jagannathan and Wang utilise a 
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conditional model that incorporates information variables that are thought to affect the 
state of the economy6 and thus allow betas to vary over time.  
 
The conditional CAPM is the simplest version of the conditional model although it 
can be extended easily to the Fama French and Carhart models as well7. For 
simplicity a general conditional model is specified, which can easily be applied to 
create the conditional CAPM, Fama French or Carhart models. This general model is 
specified following the methodology of Cochrane (2005) and using scaled 
information variables: 
 
 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝑿! + 𝜀!"  (15)  
 
where 𝑿! = 𝒃′(𝒇!⊗ 𝒛!), 𝒃′ is the set of relevant betas, 𝒇!′ = (𝑓!! , 𝑓!! ,… 𝑓!") is the 
set of N risk factors8 , and 𝒛!′ = (1, 𝑧!! , 𝑧!! ,… 𝑧!")  is the set of M information 
variables. Clearly depending on the model the number of risk factors will vary: one in 
the CAPM, and three in the Fama French model for example. In contrast the number 
of information variables will be fixed at 𝑀 = 3 for all the models used, and the 
variables themselves will be the same as those used in Eckbo and Smith (1998). More 
detail on the information variables is given in the Data section of this paper. Another 
important point to stress here is that in some cases the interactions terms between the 
information variables and risk factors other than the market premium may be 
excluded in the same manner as in Cochrane (1996). This general conditional model 
is applied using each of the unconditional models already considered, and used to 
assess the performance for the insider portfolios, the difference portfolio and the 
mutual fund portfolio. 
 
4.5 Estimation 
 
I use two separate methods to estimate the models outlined above: Ordinary Least 
Squares, OLS, and Generalised Method of Moments, GMM. The two different 
                                                
6 These variables can include, but are not limited to, the risk free rate, dividend yield, the term spread 
and the default spread. 
7 One problem of conditional models is that the number of coefficients to be estimated increases 
rapidly with each additional risk factor. 
8 For example in the CAPM model the relevant risk factor would only be 𝑅! − 𝑅! 
 22 
methods are used to test the robustness of the results; the methods rely on different 
assumptions and thus comparing both of them allows us to see how the results vary 
when the assumptions are altered. OLS is standard in almost every application of 
empirical finance studies and so will not be explained in any detail. A basic 
explanation of GMM will be covered, since this is a slightly more unusual estimation 
method.  
 
GMM offers an alternative to OLS by relaxing many of the assumptions of that 
method, and instead requiring that a set of moment conditions are specified for each 
model. These conditions vary from model to model, but they must be a function of the 
model parameters, and ensure that their expectations are zero at the true value. For a 
more in depth discussion of GMM see Hall (2005). If I find that the results for both 
the OLS and GMM estimation of a model are relatively similar, then this suggests that 
the estimates are not affected by the assumptions needed.  
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5 Data 
 
Here I give a brief overview of the data needed in order to complete the empirical 
analysis outlined in section 4. 
 
5.1 Insider Trades and Holdings 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses first and foremost on all individuals, 
related to companies that are publicly listed on the Oslo Børs, that are defined to be 
‘insiders’ under the new Securities Trading Act that was brought into force as of 
November 2007. The definition of an insider in this study is crucial and follows the 
wording of the act in that an insider is, “ any member of the board, senior employee, 
member of the control committee or auditor, or any close family members of these 
individuals.” These individuals must disclose to the market9 when they trade shares in 
the firms to which they are defined to be insiders. In addition to a notification that a 
trade has been made, insiders must divulge information regarding the number of 
shares and the price at which they were purchased or sold.  Prior to the introduction of 
this new act, insiders were defined in the same manner, but the main difference that 
the new act brought was increased supervision of market manipulation and stricter 
penalties to those convicted.   
 
In order to replicate the study of Eckbo and Smith (1998) I had to acquire data on all 
insider trades from January 2008 until December 2012. Since no database exists of 
this information I had to create a database of insider trades from scratch using the 
notifications of trades that insiders are required to make as a result of the Securities 
Trading Act. For each company listed on the Oslo Børs the number of insiders, and 
each individual’s holding in the company, as of the end of December 2012 is noted. 
Starting at this point I recursively construct a monthly time series of changes in 
individual insider holdings for each company from the changes in insider holdings 
observed from the mandatory notification of trades; each buy was subtracted from the 
previous periods holdings, and each sell was added to the previous periods holdings, 
and the total number of shares outstanding was adjusted for any stock dividends or 
                                                
9 These disclosures are listed at www.newsweb.no.  
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new issuances. If an insider sold all their stock in December 2012 this was accounted 
for since trades were considered in this month as well.  
 
Following the methodology of Eckbo and Smith (1998) I had to consider certain 
assumptions upon creating the insider holdings portfolio. Firstly, if a firm is delisted 
from the Oslo Børs then all insider holdings in the firm are set to zero in the same 
month that the delisting takes place. Secondly, when a shareholder in the firm 
becomes an insider (or ceases to be an insider) this is not treated as a buy (or sell). 
Thirdly, it is assumed that all changes in insider holdings, due to either buys or sells, 
are disclosed publicly to the market and thus can be accounted for in this portfolio of 
trades. Unlike Eckbo and Smith (1998) it is not necessary to assume that insiders 
purchase their pro rata share of new equity issues; this is due to the fact that this 
information is disclosed to the market for the relevant firms; this was not the case 
previously. The main difference in the collection of data in relation to Eckbo and 
Smith (1998) is that their data was reported on a quarterly basis, whereas in this study 
it is reported in real time.  
 
5.2 Mutual Funds 
 
For the analysis of mutual funds data on prices for these funds is recovered from 
Datastream. In total 189 Norwegian mutual funds are included in the sample. These 
funds accounted for a wide variety of different investment strategies, and 
geographical concentrations, but this is assumed to be appropriate considering the 
goal of this study in relation to fund performance. Thus as many funds as possible are 
included in the dataset. In the analysis an equal weighted portfolio is utilised so there 
is no need for further information with respect to mutual funds. There are 70 funds in 
the affiliated group, and 119 funds in the non-affiliated group after allocation. 
 
5.3 Information and Risk Variables 
 
As note already unconditional and conditional models are used in order to assess the 
effect that accounting for time varying betas has on performance. The unconditional 
models assume that risk preferences are constant, while the unconditional models 
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assume that risk preferences alter throughout time. Consequently they require a 
number of different information and risk variables. 
 
The unconditional models are based around the methodology of Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997), and thus require the correct variables as identified in 
previous academic research. As a starting point a risk free rate and market index are 
required for all models. The risk free rate is defined as the monthly yield on the three-
month NIBOR as is the norm for studies within Norway. The market index chosen for 
the models is the Oslo Exchange All Share index; this can be considered as 
appropriate as the study considers the whole set of publicly listed companies due to 
the manner in which the insider portfolio is created. The monthly prices for the risk 
free rate and the market index are obtained from the Datastream database.  
 
When considering the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models, slightly 
more complex risk factors are necessary. For the Fama and French model the Small 
Minus Big, SMB, and the High Minus Low, HML, factors are necessary, and for the 
Carhart model the Momentum, MOM, factor is required. The monthly data for these 
factors is obtained from the database set up by Bernt Arne Ødegaard at the University 
of Stavanger, who aims to replicate the database of Kenneth French in the USA. Due 
to restrictions on the availability of data, the Fama and French and Carhart factors are 
only available for the period January 2008 until July 2012, and thus the period of the 
study is adjusted to reflect this restriction.  
 
In order to ensure that the results from the conditional models are comparable to those 
of previous studies the same set of information variables is used as in Eckbo and 
Smith (1998). The information variables consist of the lagged market index; the 
lagged dividend yield minus the three-month NIBOR rate; and the three-month 
NIBOR rate minus the monthly change in Norwegian CPI lagged one period (the term 
spread). In these cases the market index is as specified previously, and the dividend 
yield is of the Oslo Exchange All Share index and calculated as in Anderson et al 
(2011). Again all information is obtained from the Datastream database.  
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5.4 Data Biases 
 
There are several issues related to the type of data that is used in the fund 
performance section of this study. One of the most apparent problems with data in 
early academic studies on fund performance is survivorship bias. Survivorship bias 
occurs when mutual funds that have either failed or have merged with another fund 
are not included in studies of fund performance. The consequence of this is that many 
studies tended to overstate fund performance, as they did not include the poorest 
performing funds and hence fund performance is actually lower than had been 
previously thought (Elton et al, 1996). The sample of mutual funds used in this study 
is survivorship bias free and this is especially important when a characteristic, such as 
the affiliation of a fund, is considered.  
 
Another more recent problem with fund data is incubation bias. Incubation bias 
occurs when asset management companies trial a number of different funds using 
seed money raised internally, but only offer the best performing of these funds to the 
public. This can lead to an overestimation in the performance of a fund, as most 
measures would not take this bias into account. Evans (2010) postulates two methods 
that can mitigate the effects of this bias when measuring fund performance. However, 
this bias is generally not considered when evaluating fund performance and is suitable 
for a study in itself; therefore we shall assume that it is not a major factor in driving 
the returns of the funds in our sample.  
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6 Results 
 
The purpose of this section of the study is to outline the results of carrying out the 
analysis specified in the methodology section.  For the analysis primarily concerning 
the insider portfolio results for both the value and ownership portfolios are presented 
side-by-side. In addition, in order to avoid being overly pedantic in the presentation of 
results, for those models with a high number of independent variables, notably the 
conditional Carhart models, some of the beta factors may be relegated to the 
appendix.  
 
6.1 Insider Summary Statistics 
 
First considering the data used to create the insider portfolios I observe some 
characteristics of the market and the insiders. The number of public companies 
included in the initial sample is 228; however only 139 of these have active insiders in 
their organisation. Thus only 61% of companies have active insiders, and notably 
from observation it seems that many firms in the financial sector are seldom active 
with regards to insider trades. The proportion of market volume that is traded by 
insiders can be viewed in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Market Volume for Insiders 
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Note: This figure shows the percentage of market volume traded using two different definitions. The 
plot on the left hand side is the percentage market volume calculated as the total market value of 
insider shares divided by the total market value of all shares listed on the Oslo Exchange All Share 
index (value percentage). The plot on the right hand side is the percentage market volume calculated as 
the total number of insider shares divided by the total number of outstanding shares on the Oslo 
Exchange All Share index (ownership percentage). 
 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the market volume varies quite dramatically 
depending on whether the value percentage of ownership percentage is used. The 
ownership percentage (right hand plot) of insider shares is relatively constant except 
for a large drop in 2011, whereas the value percentage (left hand plot) drops 
dramatically from the start of the period before settling at around 4% from 2011 
onwards. This drop in the value percentage comes near the end of the credit crisis and 
could be partially due to many insiders cashing out, or also the fact that many firms 
were forced to file for insolvency during this period. While it is not the aim of this 
study to deduce why insider holdings change over time, this does nonetheless indicate 
that insider’s attitudes towards their holdings alter dependent on the market 
conditions. This helps motivate the use of conditional models that are used later, as it 
appears that insiders may have time varying attitudes towards risk.   
 
6.2 The Performance of Insider Trades  
 
The results for the performance of insider trades are divided into two separate sections 
in order to account for the different estimation methods used in the analysis.  
 
6.2.1 The Performance of Insider Trades – OLS Estimates 
 
I now analyse the performance of the insider trading portfolios using the risk adjusted 
performance models that were described in the methodology section.  Specifically the 
analysis will begin with the results from the OLS estimates, with these being reported 
for both the value and ownership portfolios in each case. The main results are 
reported in Table 1, with the full results in Table 7 in the Appendix.  
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Table 1 
Insider Portfolio Performance OLS Estimates: Average Monthly Abnormal 
Returns for Conditional and Unconditional Models for the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
January 2008 to July 2012 
This table reports the OLS estimates of the unconditional and conditional CAPM and Carhart models 
for the period January 2008 until July 2012 for the two insider portfolios. Alpha is reported in percent 
per month. 𝑅!" , 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the market proxy excess return and factor mimicking 
portfolios for size, book-to-market value, and one-year momentum. 𝑅!"!!, 𝐷𝑌!!! and 𝑇𝑆!!! are the 
lagged information variables for the market proxy, the dividend yield and the term spread. 𝑤! and 𝑤! 
represent that the asset is either the value portfolio or the ownership portfolio. The relevant coefficients 
for each model are reported with t statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. With full results for the 
conditional Carhart model reported in Appendix Table 8. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 
10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
 CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝛼 -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 
 (-2.47) (-2.10) (-2.42) (-2.18) (-2.44) (-1.86) (-0.78) (-1.18)          𝛽!𝑅!" 0.29 0.31* 0.48 0.66** -0.64 0.01 -1.36 -1.07 
 (1.34) (1.78) (1.56) (2.67) (-0.84) (0.02) (-1.30) (-1.24)          𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵   0.79* 0.90**   0.06 -1.24 
   (1.84) (2.61)   (0.04) (-0.95)          𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿   0.25 0.09   0.45 0.03 
   (0.7) (0.34)   (0.44) (0.03)          𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀   -0.79** -0.35   -1.56 0.57 
   (-2.04) (-1.12)   (-1.23) (0.55)          𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!)     -1.35 -2.39 -8.63 -0.23 
     (-0.53) (-1.17) (-1.31) (-0.04)          𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!)     30.35 7.3 64.91* 57.86* 
     (1.27) (0.38) (1.7) (1.85)          𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!)     -24.46 -15.96 43.84 30.22 
     (-0.51) (-0.42) (0.65) (0.54) 
 
The results reported in Table 1 give the first insight into how the insider portfolio 
performs. First it makes sense to consider the results derived from the unconditional 
models.  For both the unconditional models and both the insider portfolios there are 
negative and significant alphas of between -0.04 and -0.03 per month. This is perhaps 
a surprising result given the view that insiders are privy to a wider information set 
than uninformed investors. Nonetheless the result is significant at the 5% level and 
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across the different unconditional models so this could be an interesting area to 
investigate further. 
 
When the beta loadings for the unconditional models are examined it is clear that 
these seem to vary across both models and insider portfolios. For the CAPM the 
market proxy is only significant for the ownership portfolio with a beta of 0.31, even 
if this is only at the 10% significance level. Thus for the insider portfolio represented 
by ownership proportions the market index is a driver of returns, and thus investment 
decisions for insiders. 
 
For the Carhart model the beta loadings for the two insider portfolios seem to differ 
notably from each other. The value portfolio reports significant betas for the size and 
momentum factors, whereas the size coefficient is 0.79 and the momentum coefficient 
is -0.79. From this it is possible to state that for the value insider portfolio, insiders 
attempt to take advantage of the size effect, while at the same time trading in an 
opposite direction to a momentum strategy. This result related to the momentum 
strategy is perhaps a bit surprising but could be due to insider information, which 
indicates that this is the preferred investment. Clearly, though, with the negative alpha 
this strategy is not paying off. 
 
In contrast to the value portfolio the ownership portfolio reports significant betas for 
the market and size factors, which are 0.66 and 0.90 respectively. The interpretation 
of the significant betas for the market and size factors is as above for the value 
portfolio, and the results related to the CAPM as well. 
 
Clearly these differences in the estimated parameters of the models between the value 
and ownership portfolios need to be investigated in more detail. Nevertheless the 
results still indicate that the insider portfolios exhibit non-zero and significant 
negative performance for all unconditional models.   
 
Now the results for the conditional models will be covered. For the conditional 
CAPM the results are very similar to those of the unconditional models with non-zero 
and negative significant alphas of -0.04 and -0.025 for the value and ownership 
portfolios respectively. None of the beta loadings for the conditional CAPM for either 
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of the insider portfolios are found to be non-zero. Thus it seems that the conditional 
CAPM does not offer any extra explanatory power over the unconditional models, 
and possibly even worse performance.  
 
In contrast to the conditional CAPM the conditional Carhart model produces notable 
differences in results relative to the other models already observed. For both insider 
portfolios the alphas are not significantly different from zero. Therefore the negative 
insider portfolio performance has disappeared once all publicly available information 
has been accounted for in the model. Furthermore from Table 1 above and Table 7 in 
the Appendix there are a number of significant betas for both insider portfolios. Both 
portfolios have significant betas for the interaction between the market proxy and the 
lagged dividend yield at the 10% significance level (64.91 for the value portfolio, and 
57.86 for the ownership portfolio), and the interaction between the book-to-market 
value factor and the lagged market proxy (-22 for the value portfolio at 1%10, and -
11.2 for the ownership portfolio at 5%). Additionally the ownership insider portfolio 
has a significant beta for the interaction between the size factor and the lagged 
dividend yield of 82.92 at the 5% significance level. 
 
The interpretation of the findings for the beta loadings is quite important in 
understanding the returns of the insider portfolios.  On a general level it can simply be 
stated that conditioning information, that is all publicly available information, is 
clearly important to insiders as to whether or not they decide to trade or not, and to 
the returns associated with such trades. The improvement of performance seen with 
the conditional Carhart model suggests that informed investors are able to accurately 
utilise publicly available information for investment purposes. A more in depth 
discussion on the trading strategies of insiders and what can be learned from the 
finding that certain betas are significant in insider returns shall be discussed in more 
detail in the final section of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                10	  “At	  X%”	  simply	  means	  that	  the	  coefficient	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  X%	  level.	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6.2.2 The Performance of Insider Trades – GMM Estimates 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results derived above I shall use an alternative 
method to estimate the parameters in the relevant conditional and unconditional 
models. Here the same models will be reported, and thus only results that differ from 
those in Table 1 and Table 7 in the Appendix are discussed in this section in order to 
avoid repetition. Table 2 below reports the results for the GMM estimates: 
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Table 2 
Insider Portfolio Performance GMM Estimates: Average Monthly Abnormal 
Returns for Conditional and Unconditional Models for the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
January 2008 to July 2012 
This table reports the GMM estimates of the unconditional and conditional CAPM and Carhart models 
for the period January 2008 until July 2012 for the two insider portfolios. Alpha is reported in percent 
per month. 𝑅!" , 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the market proxy excess return and factor mimicking 
portfolios for size, book-to-market value, and one-year momentum. 𝑅!"!!, 𝐷𝑌!!! and 𝑇𝑆!!! are the 
lagged information variables for the market proxy, the dividend yield and the term spread. 𝑤! and 𝑤! 
represent that the asset is either the value portfolio or the ownership portfolio. The relevant coefficients 
for each model are reported with test statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. With full results for 
the conditional Carhart model reported in Appendix Table 9. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 
10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
 CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝛼 -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03* -0.01 -0.02 
 (-2.52) (-2.12) (-2.57) (-2.33) (-2.77) (-1.94) (-0.92) (-1.26)          𝛽!𝑅!" 0.29 0.31 0.48 0.66** -0.64 0.011 -1.36 -1.07 
 (1.10) (1.42) (1.46) (2.37) (-0.70) (0.02) (-1.30) (-1.14)          𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵   0.80* 0.90***   0.06 -1.24 
   (1.77) (2.64)   (0.04) (-1.13)          𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿   0.25 0.09   0.44 0.026 
   (0.87) (0.38)   (0.72) (0.04)          𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀   -0.04** -0.35   -1.56** 0.57 
   (-2.57) (-1.38)   (-2.06) (0.70)          𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!)     -1.35 -2.39 -8.63* -0.23 
     (-0.32) (-0.87) (-1.80) (-0.04)          𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!)     30.35 7.3 64.91 57.86 
     (0.98) (0.39) (1.10) (1.60)          𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!)     -24.46 -15.96 43.84 30.22 
     (-0.35) (-0.29) (0.62) (0.72) 
 
Using the GMM methodology as opposed to OLS estimation does not alter the results 
of the models in a significant manner. However, one notable difference between the 
two methodologies arises when the conditional Carhart model is examined. For this 
model there is a noticeable change is the beta loadings, especially for the value insider 
portfolio. In the OLS estimation only the coefficients for the interaction between the 
market proxy and the lagged dividend yield, and the interaction between the book-to-
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market value factor and the lagged market proxy were significant. From Table 2 and 
Table 8 in the Appendix in the GMM estimation the following coefficients are 
significant: the momentum factor (-1.56 at 5%), the interaction between the market 
proxy and the lagged market proxy (-8.63 at 10%), the interaction between the book-
to-market value factor and the lagged market proxy (-22 at 1%), the interaction 
between the book-to-market value factor and lagged the term spread (-133.81 at 
10%), and the interaction between the momentum factor and the lagged dividend 
yield (31.18 at 10%).  
 
There is a similar though not quite so pronounced difference for the ownership 
portfolio where the interaction between the market proxy and the lagged dividend 
yield becomes non-significant under GMM, and is replaced by the now significant 
interaction between the book-to-market value factor and the lagged term spread (-
149.37 at 5%). One explanation of this difference is the different treatment of errors 
in the two methods. Many of the coefficients that are now significant are only at the 
10% level, and those that are now no longer significant are on the brim of being 
significant.  Of those additional significant coefficients not on the borderline are the 
momentum factor for the value portfolio, and the interaction between the book-to-
market value factor and the lagged term spread for the ownership portfolio. These 
coefficients should be interpreted in the same manner as in the OLS section, and the 
implications will be considered in more detail in the discussion section. 
 
Despite the findings in relation to the beta loadings for the conditional Carhart model, 
it seems that overall the majority, and the most important, of the results are robust to 
the type of methodology used. However, as has been shown by the differences 
between the unconditional models and the conditional CAPM, and the conditional 
Carhart model the finding of non-zero significant performance for the insider 
portfolios is not robust to the type of model used.  
 
6.3 Mutual Funds vs. Insider Portfolios 
 
To hold parity with the study by Eckbo and Smith (1998) I compare the performance 
of mutual funds and the insider portfolios. The main difference between the two 
studies, though, is that this paper has a much larger set of mutual funds, 189 in total 
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compared to the 7 that Eckbo and Smith (1998) use in their paper. This is partially 
due to the increase in the number of available funds in the last decade and a half, and 
should give a much clearer comparison of performance. The results are reported in 
Table 3 below: 
 
Table 3 
Mutual Funds vs. Insider Portfolio Performance: OLS and GMM Estimates for 
all Models 
This table reports the OLS (Panel A) and GMM (Panel B) estimates of the unconditional and 
conditional CAPM and Carhart models for the period January 2008 until July 2012 for the difference 
between the average mutual fund return and the insider portfolio return. Alpha is reported in percent 
per month. 𝑤! and 𝑤! represent that the asset is either the difference between the average mutual fund 
returns and value portfolio, or the ownership portfolio. The relevant coefficients for each model are 
reported with test statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
Panel A: OLS  CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
𝛼 𝑤! 0.037** 0.035** 0.037** 0.010  (2.44) (2.36) (2.38) (0.62)      𝑤! 0.024** 0.025** 0.021* 0.014 
  
(2.2) (2.29) (1.87) (1.1) 
      
Panel B: GMM  CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
𝛼 𝑤! 0.037** 0.035** 0.037*** 0.010  (2.49) (2.5) (2.66) (0.76)      𝑤! 0.024** 0.025** 0.021* 0.014 
  
(2.22) (2.47) (1.93) (1.22) 
 
From the table above it can seen that average mutual fund outperforms the insider 
portfolios with alphas of between 0.021 and 0.037, which are statistically and 
economically significant values. The only model this does not hold for is the 
conditional Carhart model, which reports no significant difference in performance. 
This suggests that either the returns to insider trades are lower or the same as mutual 
funds without inside information, and thus it does not form any advantage to these 
privileged investors, or that mutual funds are also privy to insider information and 
combine this with their superior investment ability to realise abnormal returns.  
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6.4 Fund Affiliation  
 
Having found evidence of negative and zero abnormal performance for the insider 
portfolios, and that mutual funds significantly outperform the insider portfolios, the 
next part of the study will present the results for the performance of the fund portfolio 
as defined in equation 1111. Since this section of the paper was built upon the notion 
that insider trading may be prevalent through mutual funds, as opposed to explicitly, it 
is still possible that evidence of a positive performance effect of insider trading could 
be revealed.  As such the models for the fund portfolio will be estimated normally, as 
in the case of the insider portfolio, and then twice more: once with the addition of the 
value insider portfolio as a dependent variable, and then with the addition of the 
ownership insider portfolio as a dependent variable. Again the results are split into 
OLS and GMM estimates.  
 
6.4.1 Fund Affiliation – OLS Estimates 
 
The OLS estimates for the unconditional models are presented in Table 4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 As a quick reminder, the fund portfolio has a long position in the affiliated funds, and a short 
position in the non-affiliated funds. 
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Table 4 
Affiliated Funds vs. Non-Affiliated Funds Performance: OLS Estimates of the 
Unconditional Models for the set of Norwegian Mutual Funds 
This table reports the OLS estimates of the unconditional CAPM and Carhart models for the period 
January 2008 until July 2012 for the fund portfolio. Alpha is reported in percent per month. 𝑅!", 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the market proxy excess return and factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-
market value, and one-year momentum. 𝑤! and 𝑤! represent that either the value portfolio or the 
ownership portfolio is being used as an independent variable. The relevant coefficients for each model 
are reported with t statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
 
CAPM Carhart 
 
𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛼 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 
 (2.6) (1.63) (1.59) (2.59) (1.77) (1.55) 
       𝛽!𝑤! 
 
-0.021*** 
  
-0.017** 
 
 
 
(-3.17) 
  
(-2.41) 
        𝛽!𝑤! 
  
-0.038*** 
  
-0.036*** 
 
  
(-5.37) 
  
(-4.67) 
       𝛽!𝑅!" -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.071*** -0.100*** -0.092*** -0.076*** 
 (-7.45) (-7.37) (-7.70) (-6.38) (-6.00) (-5.45) 
       𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵 
   
-0.046** -0.033 -0.014 
 
   
(-2.10) (-1.51) (-0.71) 
       𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿 
   
-0.027 -0.220 -0.023 
 
   
(-1.46) (-1.28) (-1.52) 
       𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀 
   
0.029 0.016 0.017 
 
   
(1.48) (0.81) (1.00) 
 
The results from the table above present some interesting findings, notably with 
respect to the alphas and insider portfolio factors. As before each model will be 
considered in turn. The CAPM with no insider portfolio factor has an alpha of 0.002 
that is significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that the difference in 
performance between affiliated funds and non-affiliated funds is in fact important, 
and that affiliated funds performance is significantly better than non-affiliated funds. 
Therefore the notion put forth in this paper that affiliated funds could outperform non-
affiliated funds due to flows of information could well be a possibility. Of course 
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there could be other factors creating this performance difference but this issue is 
tackled shortly. 
 
Considering the market proxy factor for the first CAPM model, there is a beta 
coefficient of -0.083 that is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the 
difference in performance between affiliated funds and non-affiliated funds is 
significantly negatively affected by the market conditions. Essentially from this when 
the market is performing poorly it would be expected that affiliated funds would 
outperform non-affiliated funds, and the opposite relation when the market is 
performing well. However, this relation could have been significantly effected by the 
time period of the study, a period in which the market performed poorly in general. 
Nonetheless this relation with the market will be monitored through the other models 
as well. 
 
In light of the evidence of a difference in performance between affiliated and non-
affiliated funds, two further CAPM models were specified which included either the 
value or ownership insider portfolio as a risk factor. In both cases it was found that 
the alphas were now not significantly different from zero, and that the betas for the 
insider portfolios were significant at the 1% level with coefficients of -0.021 and -
0.038 for the value and ownership portfolios respectively. The main result here is that 
when the portfolio of insider trades is included as a risk factor the abnormal 
performance of the fund portfolio disappears. This could be taken to indicate that the 
insider trading portfolios are responsible for the difference in performance in the type 
of funds.  
 
The unconditional Carhart models show relatively similar results to that of the 
CAPM, despite the addition of the extra risk factors. In the case of the regular Carhart 
model there is a positive alpha of 0.002 that is significant at the 5% level, and 
significant coefficients on the market proxy (-0.1 at 1%) and the size factor (-0.046 at 
5%). The alpha and beta on the market are interpreted in exactly the same manner as 
in the CAPM case. The size factor indicates that the difference in performance 
between affiliated funds and non-affiliated funds is significantly related to the returns 
on small capitalisation firms relative to large capitalization firms. Due to the method 
that is used to create the size factor this could indicate that affiliated funds prefer to 
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invest in large capitalization firms, while non-affiliated firms prefer to invest in small 
capitalization firms.  
 
When the insider portfolios are included as risk factors in the Carhart model similar 
results are found as in the CAPM case. When the ownership portfolio is included 
there is no significant alpha, and for the value portfolio the alpha is only significant at 
the 10% level, where it is only just significant. Thus, again it seems that the insider 
portfolios have taken account of all the abnormal performance in the case of the 
ownership portfolio, and the vast majority of abnormal performance when the value 
portfolio is used.  
 
Again the insider portfolios are both significant factors with coefficients of -0.017 at 
5%, and -0.036 at 1% for the value and ownership portfolios respectively. In addition 
to this the market proxy is significant at the 1% level for both portfolios. Interestingly, 
the size factor is no longer significant once the insider portfolios are included as risk 
factors. It could be the case that the insider portfolios account for the movements in 
the size factor and thus it is no longer necessary to explain returns.  
 
The unconditional models have indicated that the insider portfolios seem to account 
for the abnormal performance of the fund portfolio, and thus the difference in 
performance between affiliated funds and non-affiliated funds. It will be intriguing to 
see whether this result is robust to the inclusion of conditioning information in the 
models. The results for the conditional models are reported in Table 5 below, and 
Table 10 in the Appendix. 
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Table 5 
Affiliated Funds vs. Non-Affiliated Funds Performance: OLS Estimates of the 
Conditional Models for the set of Norwegian Mutual Funds 
This table reports the OLS estimates of the conditional CAPM and Carhart models for the period 
January 2008 until July 2012 for the fund portfolio. Alpha is reported in percent per month. 𝑅!", 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the market proxy excess return and factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-
market value, and one-year momentum. 𝑅!"!!, 𝐷𝑌!!! and 𝑇𝑆!!! are the lagged information variables 
for the market proxy, the dividend yield and the term spread. 𝑤! and 𝑤! represent that either the value 
portfolio or the ownership portfolio is being used as an independent variable. The relevant coefficients 
for each model are reported with t statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. With full results for the 
conditional Carhart model reported in Appendix Table 10. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 
10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
 
Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 
𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛼 0.002** 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002* 0.001* 
 (2.64) (1.74) (1.84) (2.15) (1.96) (1.74) 
       𝛽!𝑤! 
 
-0.017*** 
  
-0.018** 
 
 
 
(-2.77) 
  
(-2.28) 
        𝛽!𝑤! 
  
-0.034*** 
  
-0.036*** 
 
  
(-4.89) 
  
(-3.48) 
       𝛽!𝑅!" -0.034 -0.045 -0.034 0.450 0.021 0.013 
 (-0.95) (-1.34) (-1.15) (0.87) (0.42) (0.27) 
       𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵 
   
0.115 0.116 0.077 
 
   
(1.46) (1.56) (1.11) 
       𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿 
   
-0.041 -0.033 -0.040 
 
   
(-0.82) (-0.70) (-0.92) 
       𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀 
   
-0.040 -0.067 -0.022 
 
   
(-0.64) (-1.12) (-0.41) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!) 0.174 0.151 0.093 0.057 -0.095 0.050 
 (1.46) (1.34) (0.93) (0.18) (-0.30) (0.18) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!) -1.500 -0.969 -1.251 -5.122** -3.976** -3.363* 
 (-1.34) (-0.91) (-1.36) (-2.73) (-2.15) (-1.96) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!) 3.850* 3.423 3.308* 2.460 3.234 3.379 
 (1.72) (1.63) (1.79) (0.74) (1.02) (1.15) 
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As previously the results from the different models will be considered in turn. For the 
conditional CAPM there is an alpha of 0.002, which is significant at the 5% level. 
This is consistent with the results from the unconditional model. Surprisingly the 
market factor is now no longer significant, and this holds for all the conditional 
models. Therefore it seems that the conditioning scaled factors account for the 
variation that the market previously covered. On that note the only relevant factor for 
the conditional CAPM is the interaction between the market and the lagged term 
spread (3.85 at 10%). The interpretation of the betas on the conditioning factors is 
slightly more complicated than it was for the insider portfolio earlier. If a beta is 
significant then it affects the difference in performance between affiliated and non-
affiliated funds, thus is could be argued that these two groups of funds utilise the 
conditioning information in a different manner to each other.  
 
When the insider portfolios are included for the conditional CAPM the alphas are 
both 0.001 and only significant at the 10% level. Therefore, although there is still 
weak evidence of the superior performance of affiliated funds relative to non-
affiliated funds, the insider portfolios do account for a large amount of the 
performance difference exhibited in the regular conditional CAPM. The coefficient 
for the value portfolio is -0.017 and for the ownership portfolio is -0.034, both 
significant at the 1% level. For the conditional CAPM with the value portfolio no 
other factors are found to be significant, whereas for the ownership portfolio the 
interaction between the market and the lagged term spread is found to be significant 
(3.308 at 10%).  
 
For the normal conditional Carhart model there is an alpha of 0.002, which is 
significant at the 5% level. The following factors have significant betas: the 
interaction between the market and the lagged dividend yield (-5.122 at 5%), the 
interaction between the size factor and the lagged dividend yield (-6.266 at 5%), the 
interaction between the size factor and the lagged term spread (9.446 at 5%), the 
interaction between the momentum factor and the lagged market index (-0.576 at 
10%), and the interaction between the momentum and the term spread (-13.147 at 
5%).  All of these betas are interpreted in the same manner as was stated for the 
conditional CAPM. 
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When the insider portfolios are included in the conditional Carhart model again 
similar results to before are presented. The alphas of 0.002 for the value portfolio and 
0.001 for the ownership portfolio are now only significant at the 10% level. Thus the 
insider portfolio is still accounting for part of the abnormal returns, with coefficients 
of -0.018 at 5% for the value portfolio, and -0.036 at 1% for the ownership portfolio. 
The fact that the insider portfolios are still so relevant even when all the conditioning 
information is accounted for indicates that they really are meaningful in describing 
the difference in performance between affiliated and non-affiliated funds.   
 
The majority of significant betas for the conditional Carhart model in the presence of 
the insider portfolios are the same, therefore only the differences will be reported. For 
the value portfolio all the same factors are significant, with the only difference that 
the interaction between the momentum factor and the lagged market proxy is 
significant at the 5% level instead of the 10% level. For the ownership portfolio the 
interaction between the momentum and the lagged market proxy is no longer 
significant, and all other betas are only significant at the 10% level.  
 
Overall from the results of the OLS estimation of the models it seems that there is a 
significant difference in the performance of affiliated and non-affiliated funds. While 
for the unconditional models this abnormal performance completely disappears in 
most cases when the insider portfolios are accounted for, in the presence of 
conditioning information there is still some abnormal performance noted. 
Nonetheless, the finding of a difference in the first place, and the discovery that this is 
strongly affected by the insider portfolios creates many discussion points that will be 
addressed later.  
 
6.4.2 Fund Affiliation – GMM Estimates 
 
As with the tests of the insider portfolios the results for fund affiliation are assessed 
using the GMM methodology in order to investigate if the findings still hold. To start 
the GMM estimates of the unconditional models are reported in Table 6 below: 
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Table 6 
Affiliated Funds vs. Non-Affiliated Funds Performance: GMM Estimates of the 
Unconditional Models for the set of Norwegian Mutual Funds 
This table reports the GMM estimates of the unconditional CAPM and Carhart models for the period 
January 2008 until July 2012 for the fund portfolio. Alpha is reported in percent per month. 𝑅!", 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the market proxy excess return and factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-
market value, and one-year momentum. 𝑤! and 𝑤! represent that either the value portfolio or the 
ownership portfolio is being used as an independent variable. The relevant coefficients for each model 
are reported with test statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
 
CAPM Carhart 
 
𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛼 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (2.5) (1.69) (1.63) (2.57) (1.87) (1.70) 
       𝛽!𝑤! 
 
-0.021*** 
  
-0.017*** 
 
 
 
(-3.25) 
  
(-2.95) 
        𝛽!𝑤! 
  
-0.038*** 
  
-0.036*** 
 
  
(-5.04) 
  
(-4.52) 
       𝛽!𝑅!" -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.071*** -0.100*** -0.092*** -0.076*** 
 (-4.41) (-4.87) (-6.08) (-4.35) (-4.52) (-5.26) 
       𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵 
   
-0.046** -0.033 -0.014 
 
   
(-2.14) (-1.68) (-0.81) 
       𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿 
   
-0.027* -0.220 -0.023* 
 
   
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-1.76) 
       𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀 
   
0.029 0.016 0.017 
 
   
(1.44) (0.80) (0.93) 
 
The results for the unconditional models are predominantly the same as in the OLS 
case with only minor, and not so important, differences. For the CAPM model all 
results are the same with only small changes in the test statistics reported. In the case 
of the Carhart model, for the ownership portfolio case, the alpha is now significant at 
the 10% level. However, this does not have a great effect of the results since the 
Carhart model with the value portfolio already had a similar alpha. The only other 
difference is now that the book-to-market value factor is significant at the 10% level 
for the standard Carhart model, and the Carhart model with the ownership portfolio 
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factor. Once again this is probably due to the treatment of the error terms since the 
coefficients are just significant and does not have any major implications.  
 
Now the results for the GMM estimation of the conditional models for fund affiliation 
are presented in Table 6 below, and Table 10 in the Appendix.  
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Table 7 
Affiliated Funds vs. Non-Affiliated Funds Performance: GMM Estimates of the 
Conditional Models for the set of Norwegian Mutual Funds 
This table reports the GMM estimates of the conditional CAPM and Carhart models for the period 
January 2008 until July 2012 for the fund portfolio. Alpha is reported in percent per month. 𝑅!", 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the market proxy excess return and factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-
market value, and one-year momentum. 𝑅!"!!, 𝐷𝑌!!! and 𝑇𝑆!!! are the lagged information variables 
for the market proxy, the dividend yield and the term spread. 𝑤! and 𝑤! represent that either the value 
portfolio or the ownership portfolio is being used as an independent variable. The relevant coefficients 
for each model are reported with test statistics in parenthesis below the estimates. With full results for 
the conditional Carhart model reported in Appendix Table 11. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% regression coefficient significance, respectively. 
 
Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 
𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛼 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 
 (2.80) (1.82) (1.94) (2.12) (2.09) (1.91) 
       𝛽!𝑤! 
 
-0.017*** 
  
-0.018*** 
 
 
 
(-2.96) 
  
(-2.80) 
        𝛽!𝑤! 
  
-0.034*** 
  
-0.030*** 
 
  
(-6.11) 
  
(-5.08) 
       𝛽!𝑅!" -0.034 -0.045* -0.034 0.450 0.021 0.013 
 (-1.35) (-1.72) (-1.59) (1.33) (0.62) (0.40) 
       𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵 
   
0.115* 0.116* 0.077 
 
   
(1.70) (1.82) (1.18) 
       𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿 
   
-0.041 -0.033 -0.040 
 
   
(-0.97) (-0.88) (-1.17) 
       𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀 
   
-0.04 -0.067 -0.022 
 
   
(-0.53) (-0.94) (-0.34) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!) 0.174 0.151* 0.093 0.057 -0.095 0.050 
 (1.60) (1.71) (1.37) (0.23) (-0.43) (0.25) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!) -1.5* -0.969 -1.251* -5.122*** -3.976*** -3.363*** 
 (-1.68) (-1.03) (-1.80) (-4.03) (-3.11) (-2.72) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!) 3.85* 3.423* 3.308** 2.460 3.234 3.379 
 (1.67) (1.82) (2.27) (0.90) (1.09) (1.53) 
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With the respect to the main results from the conditional CAPM, that is the alphas and 
the beta loadings on the insider portfolios, there are no differences in the OLS and 
GMM results. However, there are a number of differences in relation to the beta 
loadings of the other factors in the models. Now for the conditional Carhart model 
with the value portfolio there are significant betas for the market proxy (-0.045 at 
5%), the interaction between the market proxy and the lagged market proxy (0.151 at 
10%), and the interaction between the market proxy and the lagged term spread 
(3.423 at 10%). In addition to this the regular conditional Carhart model, and that with 
the ownership portfolio now have significant betas for the interaction between the 
market proxy and the lagged dividend yield (-1.5 at 10% and -1.251 at 10% 
respectively).  
 
The new significance of the betas in this case is not terribly alarming given the low 
level of significance of all but the market proxy for the value portfolio, and even for 
this it can be seen that it becomes insignificant for the conditional Carhart models.  
 
Considering those Carhart models it is found that all the factors that were significant 
in the case of the OLS estimates are still significant for the GMM estimates. 
Furthermore it is also the case that there are further factors that appear to be relevant 
for the performance of the fund portfolio. For the regular conditional Carhart model 
the size factor now becomes significant at the 10% level with a coefficient of 0.115. 
For the conditional Carhart with the value portfolio the size factor also becomes 
significant at the 10% level with a coefficient of 0.116, and in addition the interaction 
between the momentum factor and the lagged dividend yield and the interaction 
between the book-to-market value factor and the lagged market proxy both become 
significant at the 10% level with coefficients of 2.708 and -0.448 respectively. 
Finally, for the conditional Carhart with the ownership portfolio the interaction 
between the book-to-market value factor and the lagged market proxy now becomes 
significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of -0.401. 
 
6.6 Summary of Findings 
 
The first main result that I find from this study is that the insider portfolio, for both 
types of portfolios, reports significant negative or zero alphas for all models and 
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estimation methods. I find that with the introduction of conditioning information the 
negative significant performance of the insider portfolios disappears, and that the 
portfolio itself is significantly affected by a number of the scaled factors used.  
 
When I consider the analysis of fund affiliation the results indicate that there is 
evidence of a significant performance advantage for affiliated funds over non-
affiliated funds. However, once the insider portfolios are factored in this superior 
performance almost entirely disappears, suggesting that the difference in performance 
between affiliated and non-affiliated funds is significantly related to the insider 
portfolios.  In addition the conditioning information factors, and the market proxy in 
the unconditional models, have a strong affect on the difference in performance. 
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7 Discussion 
 
7.1 The Performance of Insider Trades 
 
The analysis into insider trading in Norway after the most recent alteration to 
legislation is consistent with the study by Eckbo and Smith (1998), that there is no 
evidence of superior insider performance relative to other investors. My results in this 
paper are in fact even stronger that those reported by Eckbo and Smith, with 
significant negative performance for the insider portfolios in almost all cases. 
However, the results are in contrast to Bris (2005) and Durnev and Nain (2007), 
which both find evidence of positive insider trading returns in Norway in their event 
studies.   
 
Considering insider trading outwith Norway the result of negative or zero 
performance comes as a slight surprise, given the plethora of studies that have found 
that insiders obtain positive abnormal returns12. Therefore it is necessary to consider 
the methodologies utilised by these studies in light of these differences in results. 
Most of the literature on insider trading that comes to the conclusion of positive 
abnormal performance does so through the use of long-term event studies. Whereas in 
this paper the Eckbo and Smith (1998) portfolio weight measures have been used as 
an alternative. Fama (1988) critiques the long-term event study approach, stating that 
many anomalies discovered as a result of long-term event studies disappear when the 
method of estimating abnormal returns is adjusted.  Consistent with this is the study 
by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who find using short-term event study methodology 
that there is no evidence of economically significant market movements around 
insider trades.  
 
In the light of this performance from insiders, it is natural to question why this occurs 
given the larger information set available to informed investors. I propose two 
separate explanations of this result: the first is that insiders do not utilise private 
                                                
12 Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986), and Seyhun (1998) are only a few examples of the positive 
performance of insider trades. 
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information due to regulation, and the second is that insiders’ investment strategies 
lead to the poor performance.  
 
7.1.1 Regulation 
 
The first proposal as to why the aggregate insider portfolio performs poorly has sound 
intuitive reasoning: if the cost to an agent of being charged with insider trading 
outweighs the benefits of the insider trade, then insiders will not act on inside 
information. This reasoning would seem to hold when the notion of loss aversion is 
considered. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that many people prefer to avoid 
subjecting themselves to losses as opposed to acquiring gains. Clearly it may be the 
case that many insiders see the possibility of imprisonment, or large fines, as a strong 
enough deterrent to realising the abnormal returns associated with insider trading. 
 
Guercio et al (2013) consider this very idea in their study of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement intensity on illegal insider trading. They 
find that as the SEC increases enforcement intensity that illegal insider trading 
activity declines, in line with the loss aversion idea above. As insiders are more likely 
to get caught, their propensity to trade illegally declines. Building on this Degryse et 
al (2014) study the Dutch market and find that the introduction of new legislation 
reduces the information content of insider trades. This seems to suggest that the 
insider trading is reduced in the presence of new regulation. As noted earlier in this 
paper the Norwegian market was subjected to new insider regulation, which was 
initiated just before the start of the period observed in the analysis.  
 
A further issue related to regulation comes from Denis and Xu (2013) who find that 
stricter insider trading legislation is associated with higher salaries for employees. If 
salaries are increased concurrently with new insider trading legislation then this is 
equivalent to a reward for not utilising private information in the manner that it was 
before. Hence, it could be argued that the additional salary is given in order to account 
for the insider not being able to achieve abnormal returns through insider information. 
Another related paper by Jagolinzer et al (2011) finds that limiting the window that 
insiders can trade in, through corporate governance policies, leads to lower insider 
trading profits. Therefore if in Norway strong corporate governance policies with 
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regards to insider trading are enforced, then this could explain the lack of profits to 
insiders.  
 
It seems that increased insider regulation would be able to explain why the insider 
portfolio would perform poorly, and as a matter of course new legislation was 
recently introduced in Norway. Despite this, though, Durnev and Nain (2007) state 
that Norway has some of the least strict legislation, with a score of 1 out of 5 for this 
factor. Thus it seems unlikely that increased regulation has led to the poor 
performance of insiders in Norway. Consequently the poor performance of insiders 
must be a result of the methodology used in this paper, poor investment decisions 
from insiders, or that inside information is used in another manner than to trade 
privately. One possible solution could be the relation with mutual funds, which will 
be discussed shortly. 
 
7.1.2 Insider Trading Strategies 
 
The second explanation of the poor performance of the insider portfolios was that 
they simply follow suboptimal investment strategies. It is possible to assess the 
investment strategies of the aggregate insider portfolio by observing the significant 
beta loadings from the models as shown in the results section.  
 
A basic reason for insiders to trade their own stock is to take advantage of 
diversification and liquidity effects (Aktas et al, 2008). This means that these trades 
are not necessary based on inside information, and since this study only considers 
trades that insiders make in their own firm, then it is not surprising that returns would 
be negative or zero. 
 
Moving past the above statement and assuming that insiders trade for reasons other 
than liquidity and diversification, the notion of a contrarian investment strategy 
becomes very important. Contrarian investment strategies often consist of investing in 
asset classes that have a record of high past returns, such as value or small 
capitalisation stocks. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find strong evidence that insiders 
are contrarian investors especially with respect to value and momentum strategies. 
Similar results are reported in this study through the Carhart model, whereby insiders 
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are shown to follow contrarian investment strategies by utilising the size and 
momentum effects.  
 
In contrast to the concept that insider returns are driven by contrarian investment 
strategies Jiang and Zaman (2010) find that insiders are instead able to predict returns 
from their ability to predict future cash-flow news. An analogous finding is exhibited 
in this study by the conditional Carhart model, whereby the contrarian strategies no 
longer appear to drive insider returns, and these are instead driven by the conditional 
variables. While this result is not as strong as that found in Jiang and Zaman, who 
suggest that investors utilise private information, it can at least be stated that insiders 
are using the full set of public information to make investment decisions. It should be 
repeated here that for the conditional model zero performance is reported for the 
insider portfolios.  
 
Kallunki et al (2009) study Swedish insider trades and find evidence of behavioural 
biases among insiders. They state that insiders seem to be subject to the disposition 
effect and overconfidence, which are both notable explanations as to why returns to 
insiders may be lower than expected.  
 
Given the finding that when insiders use all publicly available information to make 
investment decisions they obtain no abnormal returns, and that many insiders are 
subject to behavioural biases, it is likely that insiders do in fact utilise insider 
information. If it is assumed that behavioural biases significantly negatively affect the 
performance of insider trades, then if insiders were rational there would be significant 
positive returns to the insider portfolios. Thus the negative performance of the insider 
trading portfolios could be explained in this manner.  
 
7.2 Mutual Fund Affiliation  
 
In their study of insider trading in Norway Eckbo and Smith (1998) stated that 
because the insider portfolio did not outperform mutual funds, this supported the 
belief that there was no evidence of insider trading. While the result that mutual funds 
outperform the insider portfolio holds again, I posit another explanation: mutual funds 
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affiliated with financial conglomerates are also privy to insider information, and use 
this combined with their superior investment skill to obtain a significant advantage.  
 
There has been relatively little research into this specific area, and thus the results for 
fund affiliation are to some extent unique, and especially so in the context of the 
Norwegian market. One study that tackles the same area directly by Hao and Yan 
(2012) finds that non-affiliated funds significantly outperform affiliated funds. This is 
in stark contrast to the results in this paper where the reverse relation is found to hold. 
Hao and Yan find that affiliated funds, instead of being able to utilise information to 
increase returns, are subject to other pressures such are assisting banks underwrite 
new IPOs by buying up shares. In Norway, the number of IPOs is substantially lower 
than the US, where the study was carried out, and therefore affiliated funds in Norway 
are not subjected to the same pressure to purchase new share issues. Thus it is not as 
surprising that Norwegian affiliated funds are able to outperform non-affiliated funds. 
 
However, it could be the case that affiliated funds outperform non-affiliated funds due 
to superior manager skill, or other omitted variables. Thus the study then uses the 
insider portfolios as an independent variable to test whether this is actually 
responsible for the difference in fund affiliation performance. As noted in the results I 
find that the insider portfolios account for nearly all of the performance difference 
between affiliated and non-affiliated funds. This result is consistent with one of the 
only other studies in this area by Lee (2014), which finds that fund managers in 
affiliated funds of funds are able to obtain higher returns by utilising insider 
information.  
 
Massa and Rehman (2008) find that funds affiliated with financial conglomerates 
outperform their non-affiliated counterparts, and offer an explanation as to why 
insider information could affect fund performance. They find that affiliated funds 
invest greater amounts in stocks that have lending agreements with the banks to which 
the funds are affiliated, and that these stocks outperform the other stocks that the 
funds invest in. Therefore the affiliated funds are utilising private information, to 
which the non-affiliated funds are not privy, in order to obtain higher returns. The 
result seems to align with the finding in this study that the insider portfolio represents 
the superior performance of affiliated funds. Though this study has not delved into the 
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details of how insider information is used by affiliated funds, it is natural to assume 
that the information would be used to help pick stocks to invest in.  
 
The finding that the difference in performance between affiliated and non-affiliated 
funds was significantly affected by a number of the conditional factors is intriguing. 
This suggests that the two types of funds utilise public information differently in 
making investment decisions. One explanation of this difference is that investment 
banks often allocate “hot” IPOs to affiliated funds, in order to improve fund 
performance (Ritter and Zhang, 2007). Hence these funds will interpret public 
information in a different manner when deciding whether or not to subscribe to an 
IPO. In fact it isn’t actually surprising that the different groups of funds interpret 
public information differently, in light of the fact that affiliated funds can also take 
into account private information, differences in strategies should be expected.  
 
7.3 Limitations 
 
It should be noted that there are limitations, and omissions, to the analysis carried out 
in this paper and that extensions to it may provide more insight.  
 
A common approach to insider portfolio studies is to split the performance of insider 
trades into buys and sells, as in Eckbo and Smith (1998) and in many other papers. 
This has been omitted here since the study was interested in the overall performance 
of the insider portfolio, however, it would be interesting to investigate in more detail 
the performance of both the buys and sells, and how these affected the fund affiliation 
portfolio.  
 
Investigating how the different insiders in a company trade could also provide some 
useful results. For instance Cheng and Lo (2006) find that CEOs have significantly 
more influence over asset prices than other insiders. As a further extension to this, it 
could be possible to investigate which insiders seem to influence the returns of 
affiliated mutual funds.  Hillier et al (2014) find that insider trading returns are 
dominated by individuals as opposed to firm characteristics, and thus mimicking their 
methodology could prove effective in detecting these effects.  
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Considering the fund affiliation section of the paper, one glaring omission is the effect 
that expenses would have on fund performance. The reasoning that the study does not 
take expenses into account is that they would not alter the result of whether affiliated 
funds outperform non-affiliated funds, unless of course there is a significant 
difference in fund fees, which there is not. Therefore including fees in the study 
would simply lower the overall returns to the specific funds and nothing else.  
 
It would also have been possible to go into more depth in the section on fund analysis, 
dividing mutual funds into different groups based upon investment strategy in a 
manner similar to Kosowski (2011). This would have allowed a deeper understanding 
of were the performance differences originate from in the study. Another extension to 
the fund analysis could possibly have been to assess the active management of funds 
using the Active Share of Cremers and Petajisto (2009). The Active Share can be used 
to assess how active a mutual fund’s investment strategy is, and thus it would be 
interesting to test whether or not affiliated funds are more active than non-affiliated 
funds. That is does insider information induce mutual funds to trade more or less 
frequently.  
 
Finally it seems intuitive to state that the findings in this paper should be tested over a 
wider sample size. Further to this it would be beneficial to test whether the results in 
this study hold outwith Norway, as observed previously many other insider trading 
studies have been carried out but very few using this methodology. Clearly the 
Norwegian market could be an anomaly, as it is a relatively small and concentrated 
market compared to many others across the globe. Nonetheless it is likely that this 
relation between insider trading and mutual funds has some substance in other 
markets. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This study into the performance of insider trades and mutual funds in the Norwegian 
market adds to the literature in two distinct ways. Firstly I consider the returns to 
insider trades in light of new legislation in Norway, and secondly I investigate the 
relationship between the insider trading portfolio and the returns to mutual funds. 
Studies in the US have previously considered the performance differences between 
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affiliated and non-affiliated mutual funds, but none have directly tested how insider 
trading affects performance.  
 
From the empirical results in this paper I find that the insider trading portfolios report 
negative or zero alphas, and that this result is robust to the type of model used and the 
methodology to estimate the model. In addition to this it is observed that once 
conditional models are considered, insiders do not follow contrarian investment 
strategies and instead predict returns through the use of all publicly available 
information. It is likely that insider information is used in these portfolios, but that it 
does not result in superior performance due to behavioural biases, the aggregation of 
performance due to the use of portfolios, and other motivations to trade such as for 
diversification purposes.  
 
The most important and unique finding that this paper offers is with regards to mutual 
funds. My results indicate that affiliated funds outperform their non-affiliated 
counterparts, and that the insider portfolios cause this difference in performance. A 
consequence of this result is that affiliated funds investment strategies differ from 
non-affiliated funds, due to the incorporation of private information into their decision 
making process.  
 
In essence it seems that insiders do not obtain abnormal returns themselves, but that 
instead insider information is siphoned through firm affiliated mutual funds that 
allows the funds to achieve superior returns. This result poses the following questions 
for future studies: what effect does this flow of information have on other actors in the 
market?  If this information transfer is illegal does current legislation cover this form 
of insider trading?  
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9 Appendix  
Table 8 
Insider Portfolio Performance OLS Estimates: Average Monthly Abnormal 
Returns for Conditional and Unconditional Models for the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
January 2008 to July 2012 
This table reports the same results as Table 1 except that all the coefficients for the conditional Carhart 
model are included. 
 CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝛼 -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03* -0.01 -0.02 
 (-2.47) (-2.10) (-2.42) (-2.18) (-2.44) (-1.86) (-0.78) (-1.18) 
         𝛽!𝑅!" 0.29 0.31* 0.48 0.66** -0.64 0.01 -1.36 -1.07 
 (-1.34) (-1.78) (-1.56) (-2.67) (-0.84) (-0.02) (-1.30) (-1.24) 
         𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵   0.79* 0.90**   0.06 -1.24 
   (-1.84) (-2.61)   (-0.04) (-0.95) 
         𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿   0.25 0.01   0.46 0.03 
   (-0.7) (-0.34)   (-0.44) (-0.03) 𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀   -0.79** -0.35   -1.56 0.57 
   (-2.04) (-1.12)   (-1.23) (-0.55) 
         𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!)     -1.35 -2.39 -8.63 -0.23 
     (-0.53) (-1.17) (-1.31) (-0.04) 
         𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!)     30.35 7.31 64.91* 57.86* 
     (-1.27) (-0.38) (-1.7) (-1.85) 
         𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!)     -24.46 -15.96 43.84 30.22 
     (-0.51) (-0.42) (-0.65) (-0.54) 
         𝛽!(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑅!"!!)       -5.27 3.08 
       (-0.5) (0.36)          𝛽!(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐷𝑌!!!)       38.62 82.92** 
       (0.77) (2.02)          𝛽!"(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇𝑆!!!)       -0.41 -50.88 
       (-0.01) (-0.65)          𝛽!!(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑅!"!!)       -22*** -11.2** 
       (-3.80) (-2.37) 
         𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑌!!!)       16.83 19.93 
       (0.59) (0.85) 
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Table 8 Continued 
 CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 
 𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇𝑆!!!)       -133.81 -149.37 
       (-1.14) (-1.55)          𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑅!"!!)       -3.68 6.49 
       (-0.56) (1.2)          𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝐷𝑌!!!)       31.18 -26.75 
       (0.91) (-0.96)          𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑇𝑆!!!)       -33.27 88.18 
       (-0.27) (0.86) 
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Table 9 
Insider Portfolio Performance GMM Estimates: Average Monthly Abnormal 
Returns for Conditional and Unconditional Models for the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
January 2008 to July 2012 
This table reports the same results as Table 2 except that all the coefficients for the conditional Carhart 
model are included. 
 CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝛼 -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03* -0.01 -0.02 
 (-2.52) (-2.12) (-2.57) (-2.33) (-2.77) (-1.94) (-0.92) (-1.26) 
         𝛽!𝑅!" 0.29 0.31 0.48 0.66** -0.64 0.011 -1.36 -1.07 
 (1.10) (1.42) (1.46) (2.37) (-0.70) (0.02) (-1.30) (-1.14) 
         𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵   0.80* 0.90***   0.06 -1.24 
   (1.77) (2.64)   (0.04) (-1.13) 
         𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿   0.25 0.01   0.44 0.026 
   (0.87) (0.38)   (0.72) (0.04) 
         𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀   -0.04** -0.35   -1.56** 0.57 
   (-2.57) (-1.38)   (-2.06) (0.70) 
         𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!)     -1.35 -2.39 -8.63* -0.23 
     (-0.32) (-0.87) (-1.80) (-0.04) 
         𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!)     30.35 7.3 64.91 57.86 
     (0.98) (0.39) (1.10) (1.60) 
         𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!)     -24.46 -15.96 43.84 30.22 
     (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.62) (-0.72) 
         𝛽!(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑅!"!!)       -5.27 3.08 
       (-0.81) (0.34)          𝛽!(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐷𝑌!!!)       38.62 82.92** 
       (0.75) (2.30)          𝛽!"(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇𝑆!!!)       -0.41 -50.88 
       (-0.01) (-0.94)          𝛽!!(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑅!"!!)       -22*** -11.2*** 
       (-4.58) (-2.76)          𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑌!!!)       16.83 19.93 
       (0.96) (0.85) 
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Table 9 Continued 
 CAPM Carhart Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝑤! 𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇𝑆!!!)       -133.81* -149.37** 
       (-1.77) (-2.16)          𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑅!"!!)       -3.68 6.49 
       (-0.57) (1.26)          𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝐷𝑌!!!)       31.18* -26.75 
       (1.72) (-1.39)          𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑇𝑆!!!)       -33.27 88.18 
       (-0.35) (1.45) 
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Table 10 
Affiliated Funds vs. Non-Affiliated Funds Performance: OLS Estimates of the 
Conditional Models for the set of Norwegian Mutual Funds 
This table reports the same results as Table 5 except that all the coefficients for the conditional Carhart 
model are included. 
 
Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 
𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛼 0.002** 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002* 0.001* 
 (2.64) (1.74) (1.84) (2.15) (1.96) (1.74) 
       𝛽!𝑤! 
 
-0.017*** 
  
-0.018** 
 
 
 
(-2.77) 
  
(-2.28) 
        𝛽!𝑤! 
  
-0.034*** 
  
-0.036*** 
 
  
(-4.89) 
  
(-3.48) 
       𝛽!𝑅!" -0.034 -0.045 -0.034 0.450 0.021 0.013 
 (-0.95) (-1.34) (-1.15) (0.87) (0.42) (0.27) 
       𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵 
   
0.115 0.116 0.077 
 
   
(1.46) (1.56) (1.11) 
       𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿 
   
-0.041 -0.033 -0.040 
 
   
(-0.82) (-0.70) (-0.92) 
       𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀 
   
-0.040 -0.067 -0.022 
 
   
(-0.64) (-1.12) (-0.41) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!) 0.174 0.151 0.093 0.057 -0.095 0.050 
 (1.46) (1.34) (0.93) (0.18) (-0.30) (0.18) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!) -1.500 -0.969 -1.251 -5.122** -3.976** -3.363* 
 (-1.34) (-0.91) (-1.36) (-2.73) (-2.15) (-1.96) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!) 3.85* 3.423 3.308* 2.460 3.234 3.379 
 (1.72) (1.63) (1.79) (0.74) (1.02) (1.15) 
       𝛽!"(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑅!"!!) 
   
0.313 0.220 0.406 
 
   
(0.61) (0.45) (0.9) 
       𝛽!!(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐷𝑌!!!) 
   
-6.266** -5.584** -3.746* 
 
   
(-2.54) (-2.38) (-1.65) 
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Table 10 Continued 
 Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛽!"(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇𝑆!!!) 
   
9.446** 9.439** 7.900* 
 
   
(2.02) (2.13) (1.92) 
       𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑅!"!!) 
   
-0.060 -0.448 -0.401 
 
   
(-0.21) (-1.41) (-1.50) 
       𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑌!!!) 
   
0.064 0.361 0.669 
 
   
(0.05) (0.27) (0.54) 
       𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇𝑆!!!) 
   
5.416 3.054 0.876 
 
   
(0.94) (0.55) (0.17) 
       𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑅!"!!) 
   
-0.576* -0.641** -0.379 
 
   
(-1.78) (-2.09) (-1.31) 
       𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝐷𝑌!!!) 
   
2.158 2.708 1.345 
 
   
(1.29) (1.69) (0.91) 
       𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑇𝑆!!!) 
   
-13.147** -13.734** -10.467* 
    
(-2.14) (-2.36) (-1.93) 
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Table 11 
Affiliated Funds vs. Non-Affiliated Funds Performance: GMM Estimates of the 
Conditional Models for the set of Norwegian Mutual Funds 
This table reports the same results as Table 7 except that all the coefficients for the conditional Carhart 
model are included. 
 
Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 
𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛼 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 
 (2.80) (1.82) (1.94) (2.12) (2.09) (1.91) 
       𝛽!𝑤! 
 
-0.017*** 
  
-0.018*** 
 
 
 
(-2.96) 
  
(-2.80) 
        𝛽!𝑤! 
  
-0.034*** 
  
-0.030*** 
 
  
(-6.11) 
  
(-5.08) 
       𝛽!𝑅!" -0.034 -0.045* -0.034 0.450 0.021 0.013 
 (-1.35) (-1.72) (-1.59) (1.33) (0.62) (0.40) 
       𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝐵 
   
0.115* 0.116* 0.077 
 
   
(1.70) (1.82) (1.18) 
       𝛽!𝐻𝑀𝐿 
   
-0.041 -0.033 -0.040 
 
   
(-0.97) (-0.88) (-1.17) 
       𝛽!𝑀𝑂𝑀 
   
-0.040 -0.067 -0.022 
 
   
(-0.53) (-0.94) (-0.34) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑅!"!!) 0.174 0.151* 0.093 0.057 -0.095 0.05 
 (1.60) (1.71) (1.37) (0.23) (-0.43) (0.25) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝐷𝑌!!!) -1.500* -0.969 -1.251* -5.122*** -3.976*** -3.363*** 
 (-1.68) (-1.03) (-1.80) (-4.03) (-3.11) (-2.72) 
       𝛽!(𝑅!"𝑇𝑆!!!) 3.850* 3.423* 3.308** 2.460 3.234 3.379 
 (1.67) (1.82) (2.27) (0.90) (1.09) (1.53) 
       𝛽!"(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑅!"!!) 
   
0.313 0.220 0.406* 
 
   
(0.98) (0.84) (1.76) 
       𝛽!!(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐷𝑌!!!) 
   
-6.266*** -5.584*** -3.746* 
 
   
(-3.27) (-3.05) (-1.94) 
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Table 11 Continued 
 Cond. CAPM Cond. Carhart 
 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝐹! 𝐹!  + 𝑤! 𝐹! +  𝑤! 𝛽!"(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇𝑆!!!) 
   
9.446*** 9.439*** 7.900*** 
 
   
(2.68) (2.74) (2.86) 
       𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑅!"!!) 
   
-0.060 -0.448* -0.401** 
 
   
(-0.31) (-1.74) (-2.22) 
       𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑌!!!) 
   
0.064 0.361 0.669 
 
   
(0.06) (0.36) (0.75) 
       𝛽!"(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇𝑆!!!) 
   
5.416 3.054 0.876 
 
   
(1.52) (0.87) (0.27) 
       𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑅!"!!) 
   
-0.576** -0.641** -0.379 
 
   
(-2.01) (-2.43) (-1.63) 
       𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝐷𝑌!!!) 
   
2.158 2.708* 1.345 
 
   
(1.30) (1.67) (0.87) 
       𝛽!"(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑇𝑆!!!) 
   
-13.147** -13.734** -10.470** 
    
(-2.32) (-2.53) (-2.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
